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The State of Legal Scholarship Today: A Comment
on Schlag
RICHARD

A. POSNER*

When I first read Professor Schlag's essay,1 sent to me by the editors with a
request that I write a brief Comment on it, I thought it was crazy; but since it
made some important points that were either valid or challenging, I agreed to
write the Comment. When I re-read the essay more carefully while preparing
my Comment, I decided that the essay wasn't crazy, but rather, as Claudius said
of Hamlet's ravings, "what he spake, though it lacked form a little, / Was not
like madness." 2 It now seems to me a good essay (though there is much in it to
disagree with), full of ingenious points often in the form of amusing riffs,
though one must have patience in reading it. To illustrate: in his first footnote,
Schlag introduces the reader to "air guitar":
During the rock n' roll era (circa 1955-1980), young males developed a habit
of imitating their favorite rock stars by pretending to play a non-existent
sound. On the other
guitar.... On the one hand, air guitar produced no real
3
hand, no one playing air guitar ever struck a false note.
Only much later in the essay is the reader told the point of the earlier reference
to air guitar:
The law review article is an imitation of the legal brief and the judicial
opinion. There are, of course, some important differences. The law review
article is typically more intricate, more thoroughly researched, more detached,
and more abstract. It is also, interestingly, written on behalf of no client, in no
pending case, without a court date and addressed to no one in particular.
We're talking air law here.4
Right on.
The essay makes four important points, although it exaggerates the fourth and
as a result paints too dark a picture of the current state of academic law. The
first point concerns the relationship between judicial work and academic work.
Schlag is right that judges are not academics manqu6, trying to write law review
articles in the form of judicial opinions and respectfully seeking the guidance of
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago
Law School. © 2009, Richard A. Posner.
1. This is an invited Comment on Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence,Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety
of Nothing Happening(A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEo. L. J. 803 (2009).
2. WILuiAM SHAsPEARE, HAmE r act 3, sc. 1, 11.172-73 (Jack Randall Crawford ed., 1917).
3. Schlag, supra note 1, at 803 n.*.
4. Id. at 813.
*
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the real academics. And he is also right that the very different orientations of the
two branches of the legal profession limit academic influence on judges. As
Schlag says, the first duty of a judge is to decide the case. "Judges can remand,
they can decline jurisdiction, they can retain jurisdiction-they can do all sorts
of things. But the one thing they cannot do is fail to decide. The judge cannot
effectively write: 'We don't know whether we have jurisdiction or not. So
ordered.' ' ,5 And it follows, as he also says, that "[t]ruth and edification are
valued by judges ... only to the extent that these serve the end of reaching a
decision."6 The judge tries to be accurate, but that is not the same thing as
making a serious attempt to attain truth or moral goodness. If, as is often the
case, especially at the appellate level and above all at the level of the U.S.
Supreme Court, the case is indeterminate-the orthodox materials (mainly
precedents and statutory or constitutional text) do not resolve it and the policy
considerations do not lean very far on one side or other-the judge still has to
decide the case. Temperament, ideology, life experiences, personal identity,
relations with colleagues, and background knowledge are among the factors
likely to prove decisive in such a case.7 Ideas will play a role, but a supporting
one. The judge will not know (though he may not know he does not know), and
no one else will know either, whether his decision is "right," "true," or (in a
moral sense) "good"; at most it will be acknowledged to be reasonable, sensible, or at least defensible.
So insofar as the academic seeks truth above all else, a law review article
modeled on a legal brief or a judicial opinion will have the wrong model. "To
the extent that legal thinkers pattern their thinking and writing on judicial
discourse, the intellectual limitations will be severe.",8 Schlag rightly derides
academics who try to pretend that judges are like them-try to bring the two
professions, judging and academic law, together-by treating adjudication as a
conversation. (There is bad faith in this pretense; most academic lawyers,
especially at the elite law schools, have been judicial law clerks, and therefore
know better.) As he pointedly remarks, "If adjudication is a kind of conversation, then one should remember that it is a fairly unusual kind of conversationone that is initiated by a summons, where attendance is mandatory and which is

5. Id. at 815. This is what I have called "the imperative duty of judges to decide":
The judge cannot throw up his hands, or stew indefinitely, just because he is confronted with a
case in which the orthodox materials of judicial decision making, honestly deployed, will not
-produce any acceptable result. They may not produce any result, as in a case in which two
canons of statutory construction are applicable and they point to different results.
...
[A] case cannot be left undecided just because it is a toss-up from a legalistic
standpoint. A convicted defendant cannot be left unsentenced.

A. POSNER, How JuDGEs THINK 79-80 (2008) (emphasis in original).
6. Schlag, supra note 1, at 816.

RICHARD

7. This is the major thrust of How JutoEsTHm,
8. Schlag, supra note 1, at 819.

supra note 5.
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played out under the threat of contempt." 9
Schlag's second important point concerns academic efforts to influence the
law. He explains that although the circumstances influencing a judge may
include academic writing (usually mediated by a law clerk), it will be only one
of several or even many influences, and often it will influence not the decision
itself but the articulation of the decision-though the articulation may have an
influence on future case outcomes. For example, there is no doubt that the
Supreme Court has since the mid-1970s swung sharply toward a "Chicago
school" conception of antitrust law, but it is unclear to what extent the swing is
due to the influence of the economists and law professors of the Chicago school
rather than to the appointment, beginning in the Nixon Administration, of
politically conservative Justices and judges who were naturally inclined to
skepticism about aggressive antitrust enforcement. But the work of the Chicago
school did help to give the Supreme Court opinions an intellectual structure that
in turn have influenced the lower-court judges.
Schlag's third important point, an application of Thomas Kuhn's famous
theory of scientific revolutions' ° (though he refers to Kuhn only in passing), is
that academic excitement comes in waves. The Langdellians, as Schlag calls
them-legal formalists, doctrinal analysts, and the like-had the challenging
task of systematizing the common law. The great treatises (Williston, Corbin,
Prosser, Scott, and so forth) and the Restatements were the product of their
efforts. But eventually the basic task of systematization was done and only
incremental improvements remained to be made. 1 The next wave was Legal
Realism, and the third wave was "Law and. .."-the rise of new interdisciplinary fields of law (the old interdisciplinary fields were jurisprudence, criminology, and the political scientists' take on the Supreme Court)-in the 1970s., The
principal new fields were law and economics, critical legal studies, feminist law,
critical race theory, law and literature, law and society, and-insofar as it drew
increasingly on political philosophy, intellectual history, critical theory, and
political science-constitutional theory.
The sequence of the three waves is not quite so neat as Schlag implies.
Langdellianism, though seasoned with a modest dose of Legal Realism, was
still going strong in the 1930s, the heyday of the American Law Institute, and
even later. Legal Realism, which had begun with Holmes and continued with
Cardozo, both of whom had a foot in the Langdellian camp, crested in the
1930s. Langdellianism essentially merged with Legal Realism to form the Legal
Process schools of the 1950s, Legal Realism as a distinct movement having
fizzled by the end of World War II.
Schlag thinks that while Legal Realism has disappeared along with "Law

9. Id. at 817.
10. See generally THOMAS S. KutN, THE STRucruRE OF ScWIernc REVOLtIONS (3d ed.1996).
11. See John H. Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy or The Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REv.
1517, 1529-30 (1984), quoted in Schlag, supra note 1, at 822 n.45.
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and .. ." (about which, however, he says very little), Langdellism-traditional
doctrinal analysis, but now bereft of the challenges that faced the early Langdellians-remains. But it remains, he believes, solely in the degraded form of dull
"normal science" (in Kuhn's term) waiting to be swept away by the next, as yet
unglimpsed wave of exciting academic legal thought (a new "paradigm," to
borrow from Kuhn again). Schlag could have quoted the last two lines of
Yeats's poem The Second Coming: "And what rough beast, its hour come round
at last, / Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born." 2 He might even have quoted
Tennyson's poem The Kraken:
Far far beneath in the abysmal sea,
His ancient, dreamless, uninvaded sleep
The Kraken sleepeth...
There hath he lain for ages, and will lie
Battening upon huge seaworms in his sleep,
Until the latter fire shall heat the deep;
Then once by man and angels to be seen,
13
In roaring he shall rise and on the surface die.
Schlag does not tell us what "rough beast" he would like to see slouching
toward the bastions of academic law, or what Kraken he would like to see
roaring rise to the surface (only to die when a still newer paradigm appears), but
I am guessing it would bear at least a faint resemblance to Mao's Cultural
Revolution. Schlag derides conventional academic scholarship as "the triumph
of expertise as the dominant model of knowledge and of knowledge as the
dominant mode of thinking about world and law." 14 The idea of thinking
without knowledge inspired the Great Leap Forward.
Schlag's fourth important point is that in the current era of "normal science,""i the era in which legal academics are living "amidst the[] ruins" of the
three great scholarly edifices of Langdellism, Legal Realism, and "Law
and.
,,6 the academic enterprise has become afflicted with perversities.
They include the arbitrary rankings of law schools and law professors, which he
argues serve "an anxiety-relieving function .... We don't have to worry that the
enterprise might be entirely worthless if we're totally17 fixated on how well or
'
how badly we are doing it relative to everybody else."
I would elaborate on his criticism of current academic legal scholarship as
follows. If one asks why intellectually weak academic fields survive, the answer
12. WniAM BtrLE YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECrED POEMS OF W.B. YhTs 158, 159
(Wordsworth Editions 2000).
13. ALFRED TENNYSON, The Kraken, in THE POEMS OF ALFRED TEtnNYsoiN 58, 58 (Ernest Rhys ed.,
1907) (1877).
14.
15.
16.
17.

Schlag, supra note 1, at 806 n.15.
See Kuhn, supra note 10, at 5-6.
Schlag, supra note. 1, at 821.
Id. at 827.
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is that fields that provide a significant service function in a university will retain
their place even if they are intellectually weak. Two examples are philosophy
and literature. Of course there have been and still are many brilliant philosophers. But "many" is a relative term and in every generation only a tiny handful
of philosophers make an actual contribution to the field. It is the same with
academic literary critics and scholars (excepting philologists, who do useful
work in authenticating old texts).
But philosophy and literature are important undergraduate subjects because
they broaden and enrich a student's mind and sharpen his reading and analytical
skills, so one needs to have a great many college teachers of both subjects. One
needs them whether or not anything is "going on" in their fields. Waves of
excitement have been a feature of philosophy and literature (science too) as well
as of law. The great burst of modernist literature in the first quarter of the
twentieth century made for exciting times in literary criticism, as did the later
rise of postmodernist theory (deconstruction, reader response, and so forth),
which originated outside of literary criticism and scholarship. The rise in
roughly the same era of new schools of philosophy-such as pragmatism,
logical positivism (which grew into analytic philosophy), phenomenology, and
existentialism-had a parallel effect in philosophy. The waves have receded in
both fields, but the need for philosophers and literary critics to teach in colleges,
and to train their successors in graduate programs in universities, remains. And
then the question becomes how to decide whom to hire and promote to perform
this essential teaching function. There is reluctance to do so on the basis of
teaching evaluations, both because of pied-piperism (teachers angling for popularity by manipulating the immaturity of their pupils) and because a teacher's
fame rarely extends beyond the institution at which he or she teaches, whereas
scholarly publication will be noted in other institutions and so cast some glory
on the institution at which the teacher is employed. Hence the pressure on
faculty to publish even when the scholarship that is published has no value;
hence the straining after novelty, the drive for specialization, the quest for rigor,
the adoption of a technical vocabulary-all methods of signaling quality that
may, however, have no effect except to turn off students and other readers.
An example will illustrate. More than half a century ago, Cleanth Brooks, a
literature professor who was a distinguished proponent of the "New Criticism,"
published a book of literary criticism consisting of close readings of famous
poems. 1 8 The New Critics were much taken with the metaphysical poets, the
most prominent of whom was John Donne, and the high point of Brooks's book
is a brilliant close reading of Canonization,19one of Donne's most famous love
poems. Just this past year (2008), a literature professor named Ramie Targoff

18. See generally CLEANTm BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN: STUDIES INTm STRUCrURE OF POEMY
(1947).

19. Id. at 10-19.
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published a book on Donne called John Donne, Body and Soul, 20 which has an
extensive treatment of Donne's love poetry, though she does not discuss Canonization. As far as I can judge, Targoff's book is a fine scholarly achievementwell-written (and not defaced by jargon), thoroughly researched, thoughtful,
and imaginative. She argues that, contrary to some scholars who have regarded
Donne as a Neoplatonist who therefore believed that the highest love is purely
spiritual (as it was for Plato), he was, throughout his career and despite his
having become a leading Anglican cleric and author of religious verse, a
believer that body and soul were one in all important human activities, including sexual love. 2 ' Targoff's book is a model of modem literary scholarship. But
here is the difference between Cleanth Brooks's book, and specifically his
discussion of Donne's poem, and her book. Brooks, who though a distinguished
Yale English professor did not have a Ph.D., wrote for a mixed audienceacademics, students, the general reader-and his book makes you want to read
Donne, or read more Donne, or re-read Donne with greater understanding and
enjoyment. Targoff writes for other scholars of early modem English literature.
Someone else who chances on the book (like me) may read it and think well of
it, but unless one has esoteric religious or philosophical interests, the experience
of reading her book will not quicken one's interest in reading Donne's poetry.
Literary studies have become professionalized in the sense of becoming closed
to outsiders. Literary scholars are Ph.D.'s writing for other Ph.D. s.22
With the expansion of the legal profession and the concomitant expansion in
the number and especially the size of law schools and hence in the number of
law faculty (the number has reached over 7000 according to Schlag), an
evolution parallel to that in the humanities has occurred. There are many more
law professors than there used to be and they serve an essential service function,
that of training the next generation of lawyers and law professors. There are
also more cases and more (and more complex) statutes than there used to be and
so there is more to write about-in principle. But in the current, "normal
science" era of law (as of literature, philosophy, and classics), there are more
law professors than there are good scholarly topics that they are capable of
addressing (an important qualification to which I'll return). "[A]ll23 around us,
there is more, vastly more, of nothing happening than ever before."
One sees this most vividly in constitutional law and constitutional theory,
fields in which elite scholarship circulates in a sealed academic medium with
virtually no leakage into the world of legislation, adjudication, judicial appointments, legal practice, or public policy. The scholars think they have audience
enough without communicating outside their field. In other law fields as well,
20. RAMIE TARoOi, JOHN DONNE,BODY AND SoUL (2008).
21. See id. passim.
22. This development was well under way by 1969, though just beginning then in law. See JoHN
GROSS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MAN OF LErERs: A STUDY OF THE IDIOSYNCRATnC AND THE HUMANE IN

MODERN LrmlRATuRE 299 (1969).
23. Schlag, supra note 1, at 805.
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one encounters an increasing tendency, especially at the elite law schools, for
law professors to write exclusively for other law professors. Schlag speaks
amusingly of academics' "argu[ing] among themselves .... in a kind of mock
of academic
common law sort of way.", 24 It is one form of the dominant mode
25
legal scholarship today, which he dubs "case-law journalism.
But he is painting with too broad a brush. It is not true "that American legal
scholarship today is dead-totally dead, deader than at any time in the past
thirty years." 26 It is not "more dead, vastly and exponentially more dead, than
critical legal studies was ever dead during its most dead period., 27 The "Law
and.. ." wave has, it is true, crested. Many of the new fields of the 1970s have
either disappeared (in the case of critical legal studies), or stalled, as in the case
of constitutional theory, feminist law, and critical race theory. Others are
moving, but on a level plane at a rather low altitude, having failed to achieve
lift-off (law and literature, for example; law and society is an earlier example of
this phenomenon). The most successful of the interdisciplinary fieldseconomic analysis of law-is continuing to grow, as measured by the number of
professors, journals, and articles, but is showing signs of flattening into "normal
science." So there is less ferment, less excitement, than there was in the 1970s.
But that is not grounds for abandoning interdisciplinary legal studies; ebbs and
flows of excitement are the norm in science and academic disciplines more
broadly, as Kuhn teaches. Nor is doctrinal scholarship as valueless as Schlag
thinks (I'll-come back to this issue).
Even if average excitement is less, there are a number of highly promising
new areas of interdisciplinary legal scholarship. One is the study of judicial
behavior, using a variety of theoretical perspectives from economics, game,
theory, political science, and cognitive psychology, 28 and also a variety of
sophisticated empirical techniques. The scholarly literature on judicial behavior
is growing rapidly in size and intellectual sophistication, and it has not only
intellectual interest but also direct application to such practical issues as judicial
selection, election versus appointment of judges, judicial compensation and
tenure, and the role in adjudication of politics and ideology, race, sex, age, and
life experiences.
Cognitive psychology has a significance for legal scholarship that goes well

24. Id. at 822-23.
25. Id. at 821-23.
26. Id. at 804. I thought critical legal studies had died and been buried. Schlag implies that it has

been resurrected.
27. Id.
28. See PostNER, supra note 5, ch. 1 ("Nine Theories of Judicial Behavior") and references cited
there. See generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REv. 63 (2008); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial

Behavior: A Statistical Study (Nov. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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beyond the light that it casts on judicial behavior. 29 It has important implications for evidence, trial practice, jury behavior, punitive damages, consumer
behavior, pension law, securities regulation, and corporate governance. And like
the study of judicial behavior, it has a sophisticated empirical dimension.
In fact, the empirical study of law'is, after many false starts (beginning with
the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s), making firm strides.3" There is
much to be done in placing law on a solid empirical basis (the analogy is to the
movement for "evidence-based" medicine), and perhaps now it will be done. I
will give one example. Courts have been wrestling for years with the question
of whether a "walkaway" escape is a crime of violence, thus warranting a
longer prison sentence. There are two types of escape. One is the escape from a
locked facility, a jail or prison, and it is pretty obvious that such an escape
carries with it a substantial risk of violence. But most escapes, the "walkaways,"
involve either quietly leaving an unlocked facility, such as a halfway house, or
failing to show up to begin serving a jail or prison term at the scheduled time.
The courts have lumped the walkaways in with the locked-facility escapes,
treating both as crimes of violence. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a
case from my court that presents the issue whether they should be treated the
same. 31 It would be a great academic project to collect statistics on the incidence of violence connected with the two types of escape. Many more such
studies of sentencing issues would be feasible and would contribute mightily to
placing sentencing on a rational foundation of fact.
There has been a burst of recent scholarship, some by outstanding economists, and some by outstanding law professors, both here and abroad, on foreign
and international law, and on legal development-that is, on the problems of
legal institutions in what are referred to, sometimes euphemistically, as "developing" countries 32 (some of which do not seem to be developing, but rather to be
unraveling).
The measures taken by the government in the wake of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, including the war in Iraq, have given rise to a host of
interrelated issues of national security law, executive power, surveillance, and
interrogation, which in turn have given rise to an extensive interdisciplinary (as
well as a purely doctrinal) scholarship with direct application to these issues.33
Intellectual property, and the overlapping area of Internet law (involving

29. See generally BEHAvIoRAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); CASS R. SUNsTEIn
ET AL., PuNmvE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2005); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,73 U. Cm. L. REv. 207 (2006).
30. It has its own journal, the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. See the publisher's home page,
www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref= 1740-1453&site= 1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008), for
information about the journal.
31. United States v. Chambers, 473 F3d 724 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2046 (2008).
32. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 151-53; see also RICHARD A. POSNEt, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 8.6, at 262-65 (7th ed. 2007).
33. See, e.g., RICHARD A. PoseR, NoT A SUICIDE PACr: THE CONSTTmON IN A TIME OF NATIONAL

EMERGENCY (2006) and references cited there.
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fascinating issues of regulation, taxation, contract, defamation, and privacy), are
the subject of a highly sophisticated, and also highly influential, interdisciplinary literature exemplified by the work of Larry Lessig, one of the most
influential law professors in the world.34
There are unexploited applications of organizational economics to law, and
also of science and technology to law (beyond computers and the Internet). 35 I
am also optimistic about the possibility of using literary classics more extensively than at present to enrich the teaching and practice of law, including
judicial opinion writing.3 6
As my footnote references reflect, I am speaking of areas with which I have
personal familiarity as a result of my judicial and academic work. I am sure
there are other promising areas that I-and Schlag-have overlooked.
I would not have objected had Schlag urged a major reallocation of legal
academic resources from interdisciplinary research and teaching to Langdellian
"normal science." He thinks the needs of Langdellism can be satisfied by half a
dozen professors in each field; the remaining ninety-five percent of the legal
professoriat would do no scholarship, but just teach, do consulting, or practice
law. I certainly would not object to a reallocation of substantial academic
resources from constitutional law and constitutional theory to Langdellism. If
ninety-nine percent of all the books and articles that have been written about
constitutional law, including those written in 2007, were pulped, there would be
a net social gain from just the saving in the cost of storage. Think of the
hundreds of articles written about Roe v. Wade and the other Supreme Court
abortion cases: have any of these articles the slightest significance beyond
registering their authors' convictions about the emotional subject of abortion?
And the constitutional theories--originalism, textualism, representation reinforcement, passive virtues, active liberty, the living Constitution, the moral reading
of the Constitution, intertextuality, and the rest-have any of them real intellectual depth or are they mainly just rationalizations of their authors' political
ideology? 37 The academics who are wasting their time writing about constitutional law and theory would be more profitably employed either teaching more
or conducting research in other areas of law.
The aridity of much current legal academic scholarship, which Schlag rightly
deplores, is due to changes in the understanding of professionalization in
academic law. When law schools based grades- on performance in exams that
tested legal ability in a narrow sense ("legal analytic" ability), the law students
who had the highest grades were usually the most promising future law professors. Before becoming academics they would put in a few years at a law firm or
government agency to hone their legal analytic skills and become acquainted at
34. See, e.g., LAwRENCE LESSIG, THE FuruRE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED

WORLD (2004).
35. See, e.g., RicHARD A. PosNEa, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004).
36. See the forthcoming third edition of my book, RicHAD A. PosNER, LAW AND LrrERATuRE (1988).
37. See PosNER, supra note 5, ch. 11 ("Comprehensive Constitutional Theories").
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first hand with the mores and usages of the profession. They would be hired to
teach without any record of scholarly writing, let alone actual publication, and
they would receive tenure after a few years with minimum and sometimes no
academic publications.
With the rise of interdisciplinary legal studies, a rise powered in part by
advances in the social sciences and in part by the radicalism of the 1960s and
the resulting pressures to diversify law school faculties and student bodies along
politically correct dimensions, the old system of faculty recruitment faltered.
Eventually it was largely replaced, especially at elite law schools (but at many
nonelite ones as well), by a system more like that found in the standard
academic fields. Now many new legal academics begin their teaching career
after obtaining a Ph.D. in economics, or history, or some other field related to
law, or after a two-year teaching and research fellowship at a leading law
school, and invariably they have done some substantial academic legal writing,
preferably published, before being hired for a tenure-track position. The period
to tenure has been lengthened to enable the law school to base its decision to
grant tenure on a larger sample of a candidate's written work.
The problem With the new system of recruitment and promotion is that it
tends to freeze out the type of person who is very good just at legal analysiswhose identification is with the legal profession rather than with one of the
standard academic fields, such as economics or history, philosophy or statistics,
psychology or sociology. That is the type of person who, entering law teaching
after a few years of law practice, would be superbly equipped to do Langdellian
scholarship.
Might it not be a good idea for law schools, just as they have separate clinical
departments, with clinical faculty whose credentials, job descriptions, and
career tracks differ substantially from those of the "regular" faculty, to have a
department of legal analysis? The members would be legal doctrinalists, and
their salaries would probably exceed those of the other professors in the law
school (because lucrative private practice would be a close substitute for what
they would be doing in law school, which is not the case for more "academic"
law professors), but they would have somewhat higher teaching loads and the
school would have different and lower expectations with regard to their scholarly publication. The practice of law has become a team effort-so has medicine-so why not legal education? Already regular law professors and clinical
law professors work side by side in general amity. Why not have a third group
of specialists, the legal analysts, working alongside them?
The law schools need legal analysts, not merely as teachers but also as
scholars. Doctrinal analysis cannot be left to judges. As Schlag puts it, "Courts
have dockets. Legal academics have time. Given this asymmetry, the academics
could always outdo the courts in the intricacy of their analysis." 38 Schlag, it is
true, doesn't admire intricacy of analysis-he thinks that what academic law38. Schlag, supra note 1, at 822.
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yers are doing these days is at best "high-end mediocrity., 39 He also sees no
reason why legal academics should want to help judges; but that is because he is
hoping against hope for a Cultural Revolution, or more modestly a paradigm
shift, in legal education. He points out that "[m]aking people see things involves
things far different from good judgment, groundedness, or reasonableness"-it
involves among other things "a reorientation of the gaze, a disruption of
complacency, a sabotage of habitual forms of thought, a derailing of cognitive
defaults."' I myself am a counterrevolutionary. I am not eager to be sent to the
countryside to do farm work while wearing a dunce cap. I would like to see
more academic effort devoted to tidying up after judges. That is a selfish desire
on my part, but it is a desire for an important service function and one that
academic legal analysts would be not only able but also willing, and perhaps
even enthusiastic, to perform.

39. Id. at 809-10.
40. Id. at 829.
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